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Abstract— Attacks of Ransomware are increasing; this form of 
malware bypasses many technical solutions by leveraging 
social engineering methods.   This means established methods 
of perimeter defence need to be supplemented with additional 
systems.  Honeypots are bogus computer resources deployed 
by network administrators to act as decoy computers and 
detect any illicit access.  This study investigated whether a 
honeypot folder could be created and monitored for changes. 
The investigations determined a suitable method to detect 
changes to this area.  
This research investigated methods to implement a honeypot to 
detect ransomware activity, and selected two options, the File 
Screening service of the Microsoft File Server Resource 
Manager feature and EventSentry to manipulate the Windows 
Security logs.   The research developed a staged response to 
attacks to the system along with thresholds when there were 
triggered.  The research ascertained that witness tripwire files 
offer limited value as there is no way to influence the malware 
to access the area containing the monitored files.  
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OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Cyber-extortion [1] methods can be traced back to the 
late 1980s. However the reports of the modern wave of 
ransomware begin in 2005 [2], this is a form of malicious 
software (malware) that hackers are spreading with the intent 
of not just destroying data as traditional attacks; but 
encrypting and charging for the service to recover the data.  
Ransomware is variety of scareware, this is when the user is 
prompted to pay the ransom in reaction in fear of losing their 
data. This occurrence of this variation of malware is on the 
increase [3]. This is a profitable business model for the 
criminal organisations that orchestrate the attacks.  Payment 
is often via bitcoin, with requests in the region of 500 – 1000 
USD.  This ‘affordable’ price is set to increase as time goes 
on, making it look attractive to pay early.  This is a lucrative 
business for the cybercriminals, one calculation [4] suggests 
the figure of 200 million USD per year is extorted by the 
criminal gangs.  Advice is often given not to pay the ransom, 
as this perpetuates the criminal business model, however it 
may be the only way to recover lost data. 
 
As the ransomware threat evolves, different varieties of 
the malware progress, some names are well known, such as 
CryptoLocker and CryptoWall, in recent  times TeslaCrypt 
and Locky have appeared. 
 
Detection of malware before it begins its payload of 
encrypting files is difficult; traditional antivirus products 
need to collect a sample of malware, analyse it, and deploy 
the updates to the virus signature files to the protected 
machines, Figure 1. illustrates how after several days of a 
new attack being circulated, only half of anti-virus vendors 
provide protection for this attack. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Time to detect malware [5] 
As traditional antivirus software cannot detect new forms 
of malware quickly enough to protect systems, there is a 
need to detect when ransomware begins to activate and block 
further damage. 
 
A possible solution could be a honeypot [6], that is a 
computer system deployed specifically to detect 
unauthorised use of a resource.  As the honeypot system does 
not expect any legitimate connections, any interaction would 
be considered as an attack on the system.  This information 
would be used to raise an alert of an attack 
 
This research looks into how honeypot principles could 
be utilised to detect and possible mitigate a ransomware 
attack on a Microsoft Windows network.  
LITERATURE SURVEY 
Microsoft [7] advice on tackling ransomware is that a 
tested reliable backup regime is the best way to mitigate the 
damage from a ransomware attack.  While antivirus is still 
advocated, as we have seen, this may not be updated soon 
enough to block an attack.  Microsoft also suggest 
AppLocker to block programs from running in common 
places, this is good advice for computers on a managed 
domain.  However, there is still a possibility of new variants 
of malware writing to uncontrolled areas.  This is why this 
investigation has evolved. 
 
Detecting ransomware is difficult due to its morphing 
nature; it has already evaded perimeter defence on the 
firewall or spam filter.  There is no simple signature to look 
for to indicate the presence of ransomware.  Many use an 
extension .locky,  but the malware evolves and could easily 
be .encrypted or .nochance depending on the variant.  
Detection would depend on an updated list of filename 
patterns [8] which would be onerous for the network 
administrator to keep up to date. Therefore, looking for 
specific filenames or extensions as evidence of an attack was 
rejected as a suitable method.  An alternative method [9] 
proposed a machine learning based system.  This approach 
looked for threatening text associated with a ransom note, 
along with analysing data flows to determine if encryption is 
taking place.  Unfortunately, this solution was for the 
Android platform, and would not be transferable to the 
required Windows platform.   
 
Knowledge of how to detect activity in a ransomware 
would be a central need to this research.  Kharraz, Amin, et 
al. [10] advise monitoring the Master File Table (MFT) for 
activity, and also suggest decoy resources a method of 
detecting activity.  
 
First, looking for a commercial solution to the problem, 
Varonis in their DatAdvantage product use User Behaviour 
Analytics (UBA) [11] to determine baseline normal activity.  
Later, when abnormal activity occurs, such as thousands of 
file modifies in a short time, this can trigger an email the 
alerting the administrator and user that unusual access has 
occurred.  Another commercial product is HitmanPro [12] 
which detects unusual system behaviour, rather than typical 
static anti-virus signatures.  A HitmanPro feature to share 
detected activity with VirusTotal gives the opportunity to 
learn more about the attacks. 
 
A second approach looked at placing some key files 
across the network and monitoring for changes.  This 
tripwire idea [13] & [14] utilise witness files that were 
monitored for modification or deletion.  If a witness file is 
tampered with, the Lanman server service is stopped.  Figure 
2.  illustrates a rudimentary script to perform a similar task, 
that if a difference is detected in a copy of file to the original, 
network services will be stopped.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Minimal Powershell script detect and react to a change 
 
A third method of detecting changes was to utilise a 
function built into Windows Server 2012, File Server 
Resource Manager (FSRM).  The suggestion of a canary 
resource [15] takes its name from the practice of coal miners 
taking canaries down mines as an early warning against toxic 
gases.  A function to control access is called File Screening, 
and can be used to block the writing of unauthorised files.  
This idea was expanded [16] to utilise PowerShell to block 
an offending user’s access. 
 
The fourth and final solution follows the blogs from 
EventSentry [17] over the past 3 years, with the EventSentry 
product being able to monitor Windows Security logs, and 
trigger actions when user activity passes a threshold.  This is 
a Security information management (SIM) product to 
aggregate log files.   Actions can be to send an email or 
invoke a server shutdown.  This product is available as full 
featured commercial product, however the free EventSentry 
Light provides the functionality to undertake necessary 
monitoring and action 
 
Having determined there were multiple approaches to 
detect ransomware, further investigation was required to 
establish which solution would best meet our requirements to 
invoke an action on the discovery of an intrusion. 
EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS 
At some point, prevention methods will not be able to 
defend against new and unknown attack techniques, 
therefore the next line of defence arises from intrusion 
detection systems. Looking to use a honeypot as an intrusion 
detection system, honeypots do not prevent intrusions [18], 
but comparable to a burglar alarm where an indicator of an 
intrusion gives the system administrator an opportunity to 
prevent any further spread of damage to the system. 
 
The intention of the research was to determine a suitable 
ransomware detection method and deploy this to add an 
additional layer of security to the network; to protect the 
network actions must be taken on the knowledge of an 
attack, nevertheless shutting down a server when a user 
legitimately updates a collection of files would be a severe 
response.  Conversely, not reacting quickly to a ransomware 
attack would result in more files becoming encrypted. 
 
To moderate against non-malware usage triggering 
overly harsh actions, a hierarchy of responses was identified.  
The model for responding to alerts is shown in Figure 3.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Tiered response to detection 
A. First 
Triggered when the first detection of a change has been 
encountered.  This was to look to email the system 
administrator that changes had been made to the monitored 
folder. 
B. Second 
Generated when more activity of has been encountered.  
This level looked to determine the username or station name 
of the attacking malware.  With this information the user 
could have their network account disabled or the station 
sessions disconnected.  This would only impact the 
necessary user, unfortunately once the network resource has 
been connected the status of the account  
C. Third 
The next intensity activity would propose to stop the 
network services. 
D. Fourth 
Produced when a fourth threshold of changes has been 
encountered.  At this point it would be determined that 
alerting the administrator and blocking the users access was 
not enough to stop the spread of damage, therefore the 
ultimate protection would be to shutdown the server. 
SELECTION OF METHOD 
Trails placing witness files scattered across the network 
did not attract any ransomware activity in the period of the 
study.  Analysis of ransomware actions indicated that the 
attack often would progress alphabetically through mapped 
drives, therefore a development to the trail was to map an 
early letter of the alphabet to the honeypot area.  While a 
filename such as #######Tripwire.txt would be 
alphabetically one of the first encountered, this would easily 
be thwarted by reversing the order of files attacked, meaning 
any early detection files would be attacked last.  
Consequently the use of a witness file as a tripwire to detect 
activity was eliminated. 
 
In a similar way user behaviour analytics were also 
rejected, once UBA has learnt normal activities, would detect 
extraordinary access to a storage area such as rogue users or 
a compromised account.  Perhaps a short trail of only a 
month with UBA to detect ransomware was not long enough 
to learn behaviour correctly, nevertheless a protection system 
that was unable to provide security while awaiting the 
baseline collection did not provide confidence that forecasted 
attacks would be intercepted sometime in the future. 
 
This leaves our investigation with two approaches to 
detecting ransomware, initially, a honeypot folder monitored 
with a FSRM File Screen, followed by observing changes to 
the Windows Event Logs. 
 
The FSRM followed the guidance in [16] and can be 
updated with known filename and extensions of latest attacks 
hosted on GitHub [19].  This is an effective method to block 
ransomware being written to a specific honeypot folder.   
 
Next, EventSentry was configured following the 
instructions [17] to set up file auditing to event 4663: An 
attempt was made to access an object.  Actions were setup 
to follow the three tiers, email, Stop Server service and 
finally shutdown the service.  These would be linked to 
filters, with the required thresholds to trigger the action. 
Determining this threshold needs some consideration, to low, 
and many false alerts would be generated, conversely, too 
high, would result in never triggering.  Each network will 
exhibit different usage characteristics, but for the 
experiment, a ten second period was considered.  In the 
experimental set up normal activity was monitored and 
averaged over a day.  Double the normal activity was the 
baseline for initiating any action, therefore over 50 file 
changes elevate to first tier, three times the baseline, that is 
150 would elevate to the second tier, and ten times the 
baseline, 500, would trigger the third tier, finally 1000 
would activate tier four.  The ability to copy and paste the 
filters and amend the thresholds allowed this process to be 
completed efficiently.  Figure 4. shows a threshold 
configuration screen for EventSentry, the GUI allowing 
straightforward edits of the experimental systems to be 
made without needing to enter complex command line 
statements.   
 
With the honeypot experiment setup, it was ready for 
attack, while a live attack would test our defences, it would 
be reckless to invite this, therefore a simulated ransomware 
script [20] was employed. 
 
 
Figure 4.  EventSentry Filter Threshold Configuration 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND RESULTS 
During the experimental period, no live ransomware was 
encountered by the honeypot, this can be attributed to 
domain wide Applocker control and current user awareness 
ransomware.  However the simulated activates were able to 
assess the performance of the experiment, first from FSRM, 
Figure 5. shows an early warning the email sent to the 
administrator and user that unauthorised access has taken 
place.   
 
 
Figure 5.  Email alert from FSRM 
Increasing the number of files in the simulated 
ransomware activities also allows checking when the 
network server service was disabled.  Figure 6. shows a 
screen shot of a how the network activity is interrupted when 
the activity level is detected.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Error messages show contact with server has been stopped 
The simulations indicate how many files can be attacked 
in a short period, but also that in the case of stopping the 
Lanman Service, this was found to have stopped access in 
six seconds after the start of the simulation. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
Further simulated testing can be provided with a 
controlled deployment of the Hidden Tear [21] project. 
 
 
While it is possible to deploy honeypot type fake folders 
with tripwire files for ransomware to interact with, the nature 
of the decoy folders is that there is no guarantee the malware 
would attempt to invade these areas, and therefore bypassing 
this defence.  This limited view of a system is a disadvantage 
of honeypots, as a honeypot free from attack alerts is not an 
indicator that other areas are not being targeted.  As malware 
is automated and will target any location arbitrarily, 
placement of a honeypot anywhere to detect activity is an 
improvement on no monitoring at all.  Honeypot principles 
around collecting information about an attack and using it for 
defence are still valuable, the study has shown the honeypot 
can identify the user along with the volume of files being 
modified and this can inform actions. Email alerts to users 
also need to be accompanied with the user awareness 
training, possibly the message needs to request the network 
cable is unplugged. 
 
 
Most alarming at the point in time when this paper was 
written, Ransomware moved up a gear, as to begin with 
Ransomware was delivered as a Trojan, but as of late May 
2016, reports of ZCryptor [22] emerge that state this variant 
also replicates it code onto removable and network drives. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
Thanks to Ameer Al-Nemrat, University of East London 
for encouragement on developing this paper and support 
from the Computing and Media Services team at the 
University of St Mark & St John.  Finally, thank you to the 
editors and peer reviewers for their time, expertise and 
guidance on this paper 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  N. Hampton and Z. A. Baig, “Ransomware: Emergence of 
the cyber-extortion menace,” in Australian Information 
Security Management, Perth, 2015.  
[2]  A. Gazet, “Comparative analysis of various ransomware 
virii,” in Journal in Computer Virology, 2008, pp. 77-90. 
[3]  M. Garnaeva , J. van der Wiel , D. Makrushin , A. Ivanov 
and Y. Namestnikov , “Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015. 
Overall statistics for 2015,” Kaspersky Labs, 15 December 
2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-
bulletin/73038/kaspersky-security-bulletin-2015-overall-
statistics-for-2015/. [Accessed 21 May 2016]. 
[4]  C. Everett, “Ransomware: to pay or not to pay?,” Computer 
Fraud & Security, vol. 4, pp. 8-12, 2016.  
[5]  Cisco, “Cisco 2015 Midyear Security Report,” Cisco, San 
Jose, 2015. 
[6]  L. Spitzner, Honeypots: tracking hackers, Boston: Addison 
Wesley, 2002.  
[7]  D. Mauser and K. Cenerelli, “Microsoft Protection Center: 
Security Tips to Protect Against Ransomware,” 6 April 
2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/29
787.microsoft-protection-center-security-tips-to-protect-
against-ransomware.aspx. [Accessed 2 June 2016]. 
[8]  J. Ned, “List of ransomware extensions and known ransom 
files created by Crypto malware,” 16 February 2016. 
[Online]. Available: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/46361k/list_o
f_ransomware_extensions_and_known_ransom/. [Accessed 
2 June 2016]. 
[9]  N. Andronio, S. Z. Zanero and F. Maggi, “Heldroid: Fast 
and Efficient Linguistic-Based Ransomware Detection,” 
Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, vol. 9404, pp. 
382-404, 21 October 2015.  
[10]  A. Kharraz, W. Robertson, D. Balzarotti, L. Bilge and E. 
Kirda, “Cutting the gordian knot: a look under the hood of 
ransomware attacks,” in Detection of Intrusions and 
Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment , Springer 
International Publishing, 2015, pp. 3-24. 
[11]  C. Ng, “The Complete Ransomware Guide,” Varonis, 17 
December 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://blog.varonis.com/the-complete-ransomware-guide/. 
[Accessed 2 June 2016]. 
 
 
 
[12]  SurfRight, “HitmanPro,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.surfright.nl/en/home/. [Accessed 8 July 2016]. 
[13]  Ben22, “Cryptolocker - using Powershell as a tripwire,” 
Reddit, 12 November 2013. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1qf7yi/crypto
locker_using_powershell_as_a_tripwire/. [Accessed 3 June 
2016]. 
[14]  Appleton, Alex, “Download CryptoLocker Tripwire 1.0,” 24 
April 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://alexappleton.net/post/83785313416/download-
cryptolocker-tripwire-10. [Accessed 14 May 2016]. 
[15]  J. Dale, “Cryptolocker Canary - detect it early!,” 21 
November 2014. [Online]. Available: 
https://community.spiceworks.com/how_to/100368-
cryptolocker-canary-detect-it-early. [Accessed 13 May 
2016]. 
[16]  Netwrix, “Ransomware Protection Using FSRM and 
PowerShell,” 11 April 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://blog.netwrix.com/2016/04/11/ransomware-protection-
using-fsrm-and-powershell/. [Accessed 16 May 2016]. 
[17]  I. Koecher, “Defeating Ransomware with EventSentry & 
Auditing,” 2 March 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eventsentry.com/blog/2016/03/defeating-
ransomware-with-eventsentry-auditing.html. [Accessed 16 
May 2016]. 
[18]  W. Stallings, Network Security Essentials: Applications and 
Standards, Harlow: Pearson, 2013.  
[19]  thephoton, “ransomware,” 10 April 2014. [Online]. 
Available: https://github.com/thephoton/ransomware. 
[Accessed 17 June 2016]. 
[20]  T. Rayner, “Simulating A Ransomware Attack With 
PowerShell,” 27 January 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/canitpro/2016/01/27/sim
ulating-a-ransomware-attack-with-powershell/. [Accessed 13 
May 2016]. 
[21]  U. Sen, “An open source ransomware honeypot,” 2016. 
[Online]. Available: https://github.com/utkusen/hidden-tear. 
[Accessed 8 July 2016]. 
[22]  Microsoft, “Link (.lnk) to Ransom,” 26 May 2016. [Online]. 
Available: 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/05/26/link-
lnk-to-ransom/. [Accessed 2 June 2016]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
